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Introduction 
 
 
Brief Respite for Lukashenka 
Russian Loans Alleviate Minsk’s Immediate Financial Woes, but Deepen Dependency 
Janis Kluge 
Late on 3 April 2017 in Saint Petersburg, Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
announced the end of the Belarusian-Russian energy dispute. New loans from Moscow 
appear to be the central outcome for Minsk. This provides relief for Lukashenka, whose 
regime currently finds itself squeezed between economic difficulties and social 
protests. But the agreement leaves Minsk’s underlying economic problems unresolved, 
while the additional debt ties it even tighter to Moscow. In exchange for its support, 
the Kremlin could at some point demand Minsk make concessions that contradict the 
EU’s interests. To date, however, Lukashenka has sought to retain a degree of autonomy 
from Moscow, with Minsk’s dialogue with the EU providing an important counterweight. 
 
The talks in Saint Petersburg followed a 
noticeable deterioration in bilateral rela-
tions. In 2016 Belarus paid only $107 per 
thousand cubic metres for Russian gas, 
rather than the agreed price of $132. Luka-
shenka argued that Belarus was entitled to 
a reduction because the oil price had fallen, 
whereas Moscow asserted that Minsk had 
accrued arrears exceeding $726 million. In 
response, Russia significantly scaled back 
the volume of oil delivered to Belarus from 
autumn 2016. And at the same time the 
Moscow-controlled Eurasian Fund for Stabi-
lisation and Development (EFSD) blocked 
the release of the $300 million third tranche 
of a major loan. The dispute came to a head 
on 26 December 2016, when Lukashenka 
boycotted two summits in Saint Petersburg: 
the meetings of the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EEU) and the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation. At the EEU summit the 
heads of state of all member states had 
been due to sign the Union’s new Customs 
Code. 
Putin and Lukashenka talked for five 
hours on 3 April, before holding a brief 
press conference to announce that all 
bilateral issues had been resolved. But the 
most important aspects of the agreement 
have only gradually come to light. On 
13 April Minsk paid the arrears demanded 
by Gazprom and Lukashenka signed the 
EEU’s Customs Code. In return Russia re-
stored oil deliveries to the originally planned 
rate of 24 million tonnes per annum (fol-
lowing the cut to 18 million tonnes per 
annum in 2016). On top of this, Minsk will 
receive about $1 billion in new loans from 
Moscow, plus deferment of repayments on 
older loans falling due in 2017 (about $750 
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million). Finally, the release of two tranches 
of the EFSD loan is also expected this year 
($600 million). 
It is, however, unclear whether other 
disputes have been resolved. A simmering 
trade dispute over Belarusian food exports 
recently came to a head, with Moscow 
accusing Belarus exporters of using false 
declarations of origin to market embargoed 
goods from Ukraine and the EU in Russia. 
Moscow restricted market access to its 
markets for certain Belarus suppliers and 
made legal preparations to completely 
ban the sale of certain EEU re-exports in 
Russia. There was also friction over new 
Belarusian immigration rules, after Belarus 
suddenly permitted visa-free entry for 
citizens of eighty states (including all EU 
member states and the United States) in 
February 2017, without consulting Moscow. 
Moscow responded – also unilaterally – 
by establishing a border strip monitored by 
the state security agency FSB. 
Economic Travails 
The promised new loans grant Lukashenka 
a little respite in difficult economic and 
political times. In the past two years Bela-
rus has fallen into a deep recession, with 
GDP shrinking by 3.9 percent in 2015, 
2.6 percent in 2016. The economy is suffer-
ing from the low price of oil, which has 
dragged down margins in refining too. The 
loss of Russian markets has also caused 
difficulties for Belarusian industry. 
In fact, Lukashenka faces stability risks 
much greater than the current visible crisis. 
Minsk’s foreign debt has ballooned, as state-
controlled credit-funded growth filled the 
gap left by declining Russian energy sub-
sidies from 2007 onward. The Belarusian 
rouble has devalued markedly, causing the 
country’s foreign debt to multiply relative 
to GDP (without the new loans from Russia: 
78.6 percent). With export revenues de-
pressed and scarce currency reserves of its 
own ($5 billion) Belarus will soon find itself 
facing new pressure to find funds to roll 
over its loans. 
Additional risks ensue from a deteriora-
tion in the portfolios of state-owned Bela-
rusian banks, which hold significant non-
performing loans to other state enterprises. 
Minsk has sought to avoid insolvencies on 
account of the social repercussions, but the 
crisis is nevertheless very tangible. Dis-
posable income has fallen 13 percent since 
2015 and Lukashenka’s promise of an 
average wage of $500 appears further away 
than ever (current average $378). The old 
“social contract”, under which the regime 
guaranteed economic security but operated 
without democratic controls, is rapidly 
coming apart. 
Dissatisfaction with Lukashenka’s eco-
nomic policies has now become visible on 
the streets, with demonstrations in many 
Belarusian cities since 17 February. The 
protests reveal that a growing section of the 
population blames Lukashenka’s regime for 
the crisis. The specific target of the dem-
onstrations is a decree “against social para-
sites” of 2015 that forces citizens working 
less than 183 days in a year and not regis-
tered as unemployed to pay an annual tax 
equivalent to €230. The objective is to rein 
in the informal economy while scapegoat-
ing “idlers” for the crisis. 
The regime has clamped down increas-
ingly harshly, with several hundred peace-
ful protesters arrested during the last wave 
of protests on 25 March. This represents a 
departure from Lukashenka’s policy of the 
past two years, where demonstrators could 
usually expect only to be fined. But unlike 
during the crushing of the December 2010 
protests most of those detained were re-
leased within a few hours. So repression has 
tightened, but without reaching the level 
of 2010 when the EU imposed sanctions in 
response to the crack-down. 
Quid pro Quo? 
The agreement with Russia gives Luka-
shenka a political boost, but does nothing 
to resolve the underlying problems of the 
Belarusian economy. It is currently almost 
out of the question for Minsk to repay its 
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debts in full. The heaviest burden is the 
nuclear power station under construction 
at Astravets, which is financed with a 
$10 billion loan from Moscow (and built by 
Russia’s Rosatom). For this project alone 
Minsk will have to repay fifteen annual 
instalments of almost $1 billion each, 
starting in 2021. Belarus is also negotiating 
with the IMF, but the Putin/Lukashenka 
reconciliation makes new IMF loans – and 
the associated painful economic reforms – 
an unlikely proposition. 
Even if the Saint Petersburg agreement 
grants Minsk relief for 2017, loan repay-
ments are sure to be back on the agenda by 
2018. There are a number of potential 
concessions Minsk could offer in return for 
new aid. For example, Lukashenka could 
agree to permit Russian investors to take 
over Belarusian state enterprises. There is 
precedent for this: in 2012, after a long 
tussle, Moscow persuaded Minsk to sell 
its stake in Beltransgaz to Gazprom in 
exchange for new loans and cheaper gas 
prices. Since then the Russians have ex-
pressed interest in other major industrial 
enterprises. 
In view of its confrontation with the 
West, Moscow is also likely to be interested 
in foreign policy and security concessions. 
Concretely, Minsk could agree to the es-
tablishment of a Russian military base in 
Babruysk, which Lukashenka has been 
resisting since 2015. More broadly, Moscow 
expects Lukashenka to demonstrate greater 
loyalty in foreign policy matters, for exam-
ple in the Ukraine crisis and on Syria. In 
these arenas too, Minsk has to date insisted 
on distance from Russia, with a notably 
reserved response to the US air strike in 
Syria in April 2017. 
Consequences of EEU Integration 
In addition to its debts, EEU integration 
also ties Belarus closer to Russia. From 
Minsk’s perspective – having almost no 
trade with the other members (Kazakhstan, 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan together account 
for 1 percent) – the EEU to all intents and 
purposes represents quasi-bilateral eco-
nomic integration with Russia (50.5 per-
cent). The economic risks of this one-sided 
relationship became clear when the Rus-
sian recession caused demand for many 
Belarusian exports – such as vehicle com-
ponents – to collapse in 2014. 
Moreover, the recent history of the EEU 
demonstrates that the theory of an un-
political economic union of equals is a 
fiction. Although the EEU’s highest organs 
require unanimous agreement, Moscow 
remains in charge. The EEU’s administra-
tion is recruited in proportion to popula-
tion and therefore 84 percent Russian. And 
Russia possesses the means to exert great 
bilateral pressure on any other member. 
Russia could potentially draw the other 
member states into its politically motivated 
import embargo by way of their Customs 
Union. One example of how this could 
occur is the import ban on meat from Mol-
dova, which Russia imposed in October 
2014 in response to Chişinău’s overtures 
towards the European Union. Although 
Minsk initially criticised the Russian ban, it 
was expanded to include Belarus following 
controls by officials of the Customs Union 
(the EEU’s predecessor). Russia also used the 
EEU to increase pressure on Minsk during 
their bilateral gas dispute, for example 
holding back the third tranche of the EFSD 
stabilisation loan, which should actually 
have been released in October 2016. 
Challenges for the EU 
Even if economic difficulties force Luka-
shenka to demonstrate greater loyalty 
towards Russia, Minsk will continue to look 
for possibilities to distance itself from 
Moscow. Here the dialogue with the EU 
represents an important counterweight for 
Lukashenka. While an independent Belarus 
is also in Europe’s interest, the question for 
the EU is how to respond to the increasing 
repression. The European Parliament 
passed a resolution condemning the latest 
arrests, with some MEPs calling for new 
sanctions. 
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Brussels should not rush into such a 
move. Lukashenka’s efforts to improve 
relations with the EU have brought about 
small improvements in the human rights 
situation. New sanctions could endanger 
that progress and should only be imposed 
as a last resort if the repression again 
reaches the intensity seen in December 
2010. First of all the EU should expand its 
support for civil society actors and inde-
pendent media in Belarus and strengthen 
exchange programmes for students and 
young professionals. 
Loans for Belarus make no sense as long 
as Minsk refuses full cooperation with the 
IMF, but technical cooperation could be 
expanded. The idea that a dialogue between 
EU and EEU would offer a way to improve 
economic cooperation with the region – 
bypassing the strained relationship with 
Russia – is often discussed in this context. 
The dismantling of trade barriers would 
be especially important for EEU member 
Belarus, because it is also dependent on 
good economic relations with the EU and 
Ukraine. A dialogue between EU and EEU 
at technical level could explore the poten-
tial for harmonisation of standards and 
lowering trade barriers. But nobody should 
expect the institutions of the EEU to hedge 
Russian influence in Belarus. 
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